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A Duopoly Model of Endogenous Product Choice

A Duopoly Model of Endogenous Product Choice PDF Author: Simon Anderson
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Competition
Languages : en
Pages : 49

Book Description


A Duopoly Model of Endogenous Product Choice

A Duopoly Model of Endogenous Product Choice PDF Author: Simon Anderson
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Competition
Languages : en
Pages : 49

Book Description


A Duopoly Model of Endogenous Product Choice with Economies of Scope

A Duopoly Model of Endogenous Product Choice with Economies of Scope PDF Author: Anderson, Simon
Publisher: Kingston, Ont. : Institute for Economic Research, Queen's University
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 49

Book Description


Endogenous Choice of Capacity and Product Innovation in a Differentiated Duopoly

Endogenous Choice of Capacity and Product Innovation in a Differentiated Duopoly PDF Author:
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages :

Book Description
We model a symmetric duopoly where firms choose whether to be quantity setters or price setters by deciding the optimal capacity; undertake R & D activity to determine the degree of differentiation; and finally compete in the market. Two games are proposed, where investment decisions follow different sequences. We assess price and quantity decisions, finding a set of equilibria where the choice of the market variable is affected by both technological commitments. As a result, the acquired wisdom that quantity setting is a dominant strategy for firms, while price setting is a dominant strategy from a social standpoint, may not be confirmed.

The Economics of Vertically Differentiated Markets

The Economics of Vertically Differentiated Markets PDF Author: Luca Lambertini
Publisher: Edward Elgar Publishing
ISBN: 9781781958315
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 240

Book Description
'This is a high-quality book on an important and central topic in the theory of industrial organisation. It is a cohesive and extremely well written volume which is destined to become a standard work on the subject.' - Mark Casson, University of Reading, UK This original new book offers a comprehensive and engaging perspective on the theory of vertical differentiation. It enables the reader to grasp the key concepts and effects that product quality has both on firms' behaviour and market structure, and the ways in which this relationship has evolved. With contributions from prominent figures in the field, the book investigates a number of important topics, such as the choice of the optimal product range, profit sharing, the existence of equilibrium in duopoly games, positional effects attached to status goods, international trade, collusion, advertising and the dynamics of capital accumulation for quality improvement and product innovation. Using both static and dynamic approaches, these aspects are assessed in relation to the manifold issues of regulation, competition policy and trade policy. Product differentiation and its influence on consumer behaviour and the performance of firms is a core topic in the existing literature in the fields of industrial organization, international trade and economic growth. This book will be an essential read for researchers, students and professional scholars working in these areas, especially those with an interest in antitrust regulation.

Endogenous Choice of Capacity and Product Innovation in a Differentiated Duopoly

Endogenous Choice of Capacity and Product Innovation in a Differentiated Duopoly PDF Author: Luca Lambertini
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages :

Book Description


The Economic Theory of Product Differentiation

The Economic Theory of Product Differentiation PDF Author: John Beath
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
ISBN: 9780521335522
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 220

Book Description
There are few industries in modern market economies that do not manufacture differentiated products. This book provides a systematic explanation and analysis of the widespread prevalence of this important category of products. The authors concentrate on models in which product selection is endogenous. In the first four chapters they consider models that try to predict the level of product differentiation that would emerge in situations of market equilibrium. These market equilibria with differentiated products are characterised and then compared with social welfare optima. Particular attention is paid to the distinction between horizontal and vertical differentiation as well as to the related issues of product quality and durability. This book brings together the most important theoretical contributions to these topics in a succinct and coherent manner. One of its major strengths is the way in which it carefully sets out the basic intuition behind the formal results. It will be useful to advanced undergraduate and graduate students taking courses in industrial economics and microeconomic theory.

Endogenous Quality Choice

Endogenous Quality Choice PDF Author: Tarek H. Selim
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 41

Book Description
The present paper is concerned with providing a core model to address the issue of firms simultaneously competing in both prices and quantities (capacity levels) within a simple duopoly market setting where products are asymmetrically differentiated by endogenous quality location. A three-stage competitive framework is introduced such that non-collusive firms compete in quality location, followed by choice of fixed capacity, and finally, they compete in prices. There is a continuum of consumers uniformly distributed along a vertical quality street of product locations. In general, a Bertrand-Nash equilibrium with fixed Cournot quantities (fixed capacity) is achieved. Firms tend to move away from minimum differentiation as quality cross-effects in fixed cost investments become less severe, but not necessarily choosing quality locations which would lead towards an outcome of maximum differentiation. An output asymmetry always exists at equilibrium such that the high quality firm always carries excess production capacity relative to the low quality firm. Total production capacity, however, may not fully cover market demand for an incumbent duopoly.

On the Endogenous Choice of Bertrand Vs. Cournot Equilibrium in a Duopoly

On the Endogenous Choice of Bertrand Vs. Cournot Equilibrium in a Duopoly PDF Author: Flavio Delbono
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 12

Book Description


Endogenous Timing and Strategic Choice

Endogenous Timing and Strategic Choice PDF Author: Victor J. Tremblay
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 0

Book Description
Cournot establishes a Nash equilibrium to a duopoly game under output competition; Bertrand finds a different Nash equilibrium under price competition. Both treat the strategic choice variable (output versus price) and the timing of play as exogenous. We investigate Cournot-Bertrand models where one firm competes in output and the other competes in price in both static and dynamic settings. We also develop a general model where both the timing of play and the strategic choice variables are endogenous. Consistent with the conduct of Honda and Scion, we show that Cournot-Bertrand behaviour can be a Nash equilibrium outcome.

Endogenous Timing in a Mixed Duopoly with Capacity Choice

Endogenous Timing in a Mixed Duopoly with Capacity Choice PDF Author: Juan Carlos Barcena Ruiz
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 0

Book Description
An endogenous order of moves is analyzed in a mixed duopoly where firms first strategically choose their capacity levels and then compete at price level. In equilibrium, firms are shown to set prices simultaneously while capacities are chosen sequentially. This result is in contrast to the assumption of simultaneous order of moves for capacities choice made by Bárcena-Ruiz and Garzón (Economics Bulletin, Vol. 12 (2007), pp. 1-7) in a mixed duopoly. Besides, we find that there are two equilibria: in one of them the public firm is the leader in capacities and, in the other, the follower.