A Conventional Approach to an Unconventional War PDF Download

Author: Wallace Hall Nutting
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 106

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Author: THOMAS R. MOCKAITIS
Publisher:
ISBN: 9788765119830
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 0

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Author: Thomas R. Mockaitis
Publisher: Bloomsbury Publishing USA
ISBN: 1440828342
Category : History
Languages : en
Pages : 380

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This volume offers a comprehensive history of warfare since 1648, covering conventional and unconventional operations and demonstrating how most modern wars have been hybrid affairs that involved both. Military historian Thomas R. Mockaitis considers how epic struggles like the American Civil War, World Wars I and II, and the conflicts in the Middle East, among many others, shaped human history. The coverage serves to highlight four themes: the relationship between armed forces and the societies that create them, the impact of technology (not just armaments) on warfare, the role of ideas and attitudes toward violence in determining why and how wars are fought, and the relationship between conventional and unconventional operations. The book also covers the advent and evolution of unconventional warfare, including counterinsurgency, the War on Terror, and current conflicts in the Middle East. It concludes with consideration of the forms armed conflict will take in the future. The book includes valuable excerpts from the writings of military thinkers such as Clausewitz and Sun Tzu, an extensive bibliography of primary and secondary sources, and supporting maps and diagrams.

Author: David Tucker
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Armed Forces
Languages : en
Pages : 92

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Are there limits to military transformation? Or, if it seems obvious that there must be limits to transformation, what are they exactly, why do they arise, and how can we identify them so that we may better accomplish the transformation that the U.S. military is capable of? If limits to military change and transformation exist, what are the broader implications for national policy and strategy? The author offers some answers to these questions by analyzing the efforts of the French, British, and Americans to deal with irregular threats after World War II.

Author: Naval Postgraduate Naval Postgraduate School
Publisher: Createspace Independent Publishing Platform
ISBN: 9781535306836
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 106

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The United States has repeatedly engaged in irregular warfare-including counterinsurgency, foreign internal defense, and unconventional warfare-throughout its history. However, despite its familiarity with irregular warfare, there is reluctance on the part of U.S. presidents, military leaders, and even the general public to engage in this form of war. This work asks why the U.S. security mindset is focused on traditional large-scale warfare, even when the threats the United States has faced, and will continue to face, are mostly irregular. To answer this question, this work uses Arreguin-Toft's strategic interaction model-which looks at why same-approach and opposite-approach strategies (direct and indirect) favor strong and weak actors differently-to analyze the U.S. Revolutionary War, when the United States was the weak actor, and the Vietnam conflict, when the United States was the strong actor, and to assess whether the United States implemented the correct forms of strategic interaction in each conflict. This study finds that the United States' propensity for traditional large-scale warfare is based upon its desire to achieve victory in the shortest amount of time. Furthermore, a preponderance of resources and instruments of war has also impelled the United States to employ overwhelming mass, maneuver, and firepower, instead of irregular warfare with a protracted timeline strategy."

Author: U S Army Command and General Staff Coll
Publisher: CreateSpace
ISBN: 9781500100674
Category : History
Languages : en
Pages : 64

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Considering the history of unconventional warfare in the United States, and specifically, during the Civil War, it begs the question: Did the Confederacy's strategy to engage in unconventional warfare significantly contribute to its conventional strategy? Two assertions remain most accepted by historians and military personnel. The first prevailing opinion is that the Confederacy's use of unconventional warfare was ineffective and negatively affected the overall campaign. The second opinion is that the South's unconventional efforts yielded unparalleled success and prolonged the war. To evaluate the impact of the Confederacy's unconventional campaign plan, the methodology of this study addresses several subordinate questions: Did the Confederacy adopt an unconventional war strategy as part of its overall strategy? How did conventional military leaders apply unconventional warfare? What effects did unconventional warfare have on conventional operations? Was unconventional warfare at the tactical level linked to operational and strategic level objectives?

Author: David Tucker
Publisher:
ISBN: 9781461181859
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 88

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As the Quadrennial Defense Review Report for 2006 makes clear, the Department of Defense (DoD) is committed to transforming itself. In the years to come, it will continue to transform its regular or conventional warfare capabilities, that is, its capabilities to operate against the military forces of other states. But the Report also makes clear that DoD must give "greater emphasis to the war on terror and irregular warfare activities, including long-duration unconventional warfare, counterterrorism, counterinsurgency, and military support for stabilization and reconstruction efforts." This ambitious agenda raises some questions. Are there limits to military transformation? Are there some changes that militaries cannot or should not make? Or, if it seems too obvious that there must be limits to transformation, what are they exactly, why do they arise, and how can we identify them so that we may better accomplish the transformation that the U.S. military is capable of? For example, can militaries transform themselves to deal with irregular threats? Should they? Will efforts to transform at the same time both regular and irregular warfare capabilities conflict? Will one transformation frustrate the other? If limits to military change and transformation exist, what are the broader implications for national policy and strategy? If transformation of both regular and irregular capabilities is not possible, which should we choose? And, again, to what extent is that choice in our power? The following case studies of three militaries (the French, British, and American) that confronted irregular or unconventional threats in the midst of significant conventional threats offer some answers to these questions. In each case, the issue or important point is not that militaries are static or find it hard to change, as is often said. In all three cases, the militaries did, in fact, change or transform themselves. The important issue is which changes were possible, which proved superficial and faded, which endured and why. Answering these questions is important not just for defense planning and strategy. Answering them will affect national strategy as well, since DoD is part of a broader national effort to deal with the regular and irregular threats we face. If we understand DoD's limitations, then we should be in a better position to devise an effective national approach. As the case studies show, the three militaries responded to irregular threats, but did so differently and with different degrees of success. How do we explain these different responses? In the cases examined, external threats engaged the institutional interests and professional concerns of military officers and led to innovations. At the same time, military professionalism also led the militaries to see those threats through the conventions of the military profession. Political institutions and historical circumstances shape these conventions and help explain variations in the responses of the three militaries studied. But these variations take place within, and affect a larger convention common to all three that focuses on directly engaging and killing the enemy as the principal task of a military. Since this approach is not effective in irregular or unconventional warfare, to the degree that the militaries were limited to innovating within it, they failed.

Author: Dr. Robert F. Baumann
Publisher: Pickle Partners Publishing
ISBN: 1782899650
Category : History
Languages : en
Pages : 296

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[Includes 12 maps and 4 tables] In recent years, the U.S. Army has paid increasing attention to the conduct of unconventional warfare. However, the base of historical experience available for study has been largely American and overwhelmingly Western. In Russian-Soviet Unconventional Wars in the Caucasus, Central Asia, and Afghanistan, Dr. Robert F. Baumann makes a significant contribution to the expansion of that base with a well-researched analysis of four important episodes from the Russian-Soviet experience with unconventional wars. Primarily employing Russian sources, including important archival documents only recently declassified and made available to Western scholars, Dr. Baumann provides an insightful look at the Russian conquest of the Caucasian mountaineers (1801-59), the subjugation of Central Asia (1839-81), the reconquest of Central Asia by the Red Army (1918-33), and the Soviet war in Afghanistan (1979-89). The history of these wars—especially as it relates to the battle tactics, force structure, and strategy employed in them—offers important new perspectives on elements of continuity and change in combat over two centuries. This is the first study to provide an in-depth examination of the evolution of the Russian and Soviet unconventional experience on the predominantly Muslim southern periphery of the former empire. There, the Russians encountered fierce resistance by peoples whose cultures and views of war differed sharply from their own. Consequently, this Leavenworth Paper addresses not only issues germane to combat but to a wide spectrum of civic and propaganda operations as well.

Author: Josh Luberisse
Publisher: Fortis Novum Mundum
ISBN:
Category : History
Languages : en
Pages : 255

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Book Description
"A Boydian Approach to Mastering Unconventional Warfare" is a seminal work that delves deeply into the strategic principles of John Boyd, a legendary military strategist, and applies them to the complex realm of unconventional warfare. This book presents a comprehensive analysis of Boyd's key concepts, most notably the OODA Loop (Observe, Orient, Decide, Act), and explores their application in the context of irregular and asymmetric conflicts that dominate the modern geopolitical landscape. The author meticulously explores how Boyd's principles of adaptability, speed, and fluidity in decision-making can be applied to unconventional warfare tactics such as guerrilla warfare, insurgency, counterinsurgency, and cyber warfare. The book emphasizes the importance of understanding the psychological and moral dimensions of warfare, in addition to the physical aspect, a concept Boyd championed and which remains highly relevant in today’s conflict scenarios. Through a blend of historical analysis, case studies, and contemporary examples, "A Boydian Approach to Mastering Unconventional Warfare" offers insightful strategies for dealing with non-traditional threats in a rapidly evolving global context. It addresses the challenges of combating non-state actors, the use of technology in irregular warfare, and the need for innovative and adaptive strategies in response to the unpredictable nature of modern conflicts. This book is not only a tribute to Boyd's groundbreaking work but also an essential guide for military strategists, policymakers, and security professionals who are grappling with the complexities of contemporary warfare. It provides a nuanced understanding of how unconventional warfare strategies can be developed and executed effectively, making it a crucial addition to the field of military strategy and national security studies.

Author: Liang Qiao
Publisher: NewsMax Media, Inc.
ISBN: 9780971680722
Category : Asymmetric warfare
Languages : en
Pages : 228

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Three years before the September 11 bombing of the World Trade Center-a Chinese military manual called Unrestricted Warfare touted such an attack-suggesting it would be difficult for the U.S. military to cope with. The events of September ll were not a random act perpetrated by independent agents. The doctrine of total war outlined in Unrestricted Warfare clearly demonstrates that the People's Republic of China is preparing to confront the United States and our allies by conducting "asymmetrical" or multidimensional attack on almost every aspect of our social, economic and political life.